We study delegating a consumer's treatment plan decisions to an altruistic physician. The physician's degree of altruism is his private information. The consumer's illness severity will be learned by the physician, and also will become his private information. Treatments are discrete choices, and can be combined to form treatment plans. We distinguish between two commitment regimes. In the …rst, the physician can commit to treatment decisions at the time a payment contract is accepted. In the second, the physician cannot commit to treatment decisions at that time, and will wait until he learns about the patient's illness to do so. In the commitment game, the …rst best is implemented by a single payment contract to all types of altruistic physician. In the noncommitment game, the …rst best is not achieved All but the most altruistic physician earn positive pro…ts, and treatment decisions are distorted from the …rst best.
Introduction
Physicians have di¤erent practice styles. Patients with similar medical conditions often get treated di¤erently.
Practice-style variations are present across specialties such as obstetrics (Epstein and Nicholson (2009) (Molitor (2012) ), and primary care (Grytten and SØrensen (2003) ). Practice variations can be very costly if physicians deviate from using cost-e¤ective treatments. In fact, Phelps and Parente (1990) estimated an annual welfare loss valued at US $33 billions due to hospitalization rate variations.
Current theory explains practice variation by information di¤usion and physician learning (Phelps (1992) , Phelps and Mooney (1993) ). Under this hypothesis, practice variation should be smaller within markets than between markets, and should diminish over time. However, Epstein and Nicholson (2009) …nd the opposite:
for risk-adjusted cesarean-section rates, within-market variation is twice that of between-market variation; almost 30% of the variation is due to time-invariant, physician-speci…c factors other than experience, gender, race, and where a physician received residency training. This time-invariant, physician-speci…c factor likely re ‡ects physicians'intrinsic preferences about the appropriate treatments for their patients.
In this paper, we model practice styles by physicians' heterogenous preferences towards their patients.
Physicians are partially altruistic, their utilities being weighted sums of pro…ts and patients'utilities. Physicians have multiple treatment options, and patients'illness severities di¤er. Physicians'tasks are to match patients with di¤erent severities to di¤erent treatment plans. However, physicians possess private information about patient's illness severity, and their treatment decisions are noncontractible.
We study the following questions. What is the e¢ cient treatment plan when there are multiple treatment Since Arrow (1963) observed the importance of altruistic physicians in the health market, the altruisticphysician assumption has been widely adopted. 1 While most papers in the literature have assumed that the 1 A sample of papers using the altruism assumption in the health literature includes Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) , Choné and Ma (2011) , Dranove and Spier (2003) , Dusheiko et al. (2006) , McGuire (1986, 1990) , degree of altruism is given and known, we go beyond the …xed-altruism assumption and allow the physician to be of many di¤erent types, this being his private information. 2 An altruistic physician may trade o¤ his own pro…t against the consumer's utility. This formal construct does permit an ultra altruistic physician to run a …nancial loss to subsidize treatments. This, however, is unrealistic. Being an economic agent, a physician must face some …nancial constraints, so we assume that a physician must on average earn a minimum pro…t. We do allow a physician to sustain some …nancial loss sometimes, but he must expect to earn a minimum pro…t on average. We normalize this minimum expected pro…t to zero. 3 The physician practice-style issue rests on an environment in which many treatment options for an illness are available. We model multiple treatment options in the simplest way. A less costly treatment succeeds in eliminating a patient's illness disutility with a lower probability. A second treatment is more costly, but succeeds with a higher probability. In contrast to papers in the literature, we let physicians combine treatments. For example, a high-cost treatment may be used after a low-cost treatment fails to eradicate the illness. The physician decides on sequences of treatments, which we call treatment plans or protocols.
Our main …ndings are the following. First, the …rst-best treatment plan prescribes a conservative approach under a cost-convexity assumption, which says that the higher the success probability, the higher is the cost per unit success probability. If the severity is low, then no treatment is used; if it is of medium value, a low-cost treatment will be used; if it is high, then the low-cost treatment will be used, followed by the high-cost treatment if necessary. In other words, the consumer should never take the high-cost treatment before trying the low-cost treatment.
Second, the …rst best can be implemented by a single contract when the physician can commit to treatment plans before learning about patients'severities. This result is surprising both because in principal- Jack (2005) , Ma (1998) , Ma and Riordan (2002) , Makris and Siciliani (2011) , Newhouse (1970) , Rochaix (1989) , and Rogerson (1994) . agent models, information asymmetry often generates information rent and distortions, and because the …rst best is implemented without the use of any contract menu. Third, the …rst best is infeasible when the physician cannot commit to treatment plans; the physician earns excess pro…ts, and treatment decisions are distorted from the …rst best.
To explain our results, we should …rst describe the extensive-form game. In Stage 1, an insurer o¤ers an insurance contract to the consumer, and a payment contract to the physician, which consists of a capitation payment and the physician's share of treatment cost. In Stage 2, nature determines the physician's degree of altruism, which is privately known to the physician. In Stage 3, the physician and the consumer decide whether to accept the contract. The physician also decides on a practice style which is a rule for prescribing a treatment plan for any illness severity. In Stage 4, nature determines the patient's illness severity. The physician learns the illness severity and follows the treatment plan decided in Stage 3.
The commitment power manifests in Stage 3. At that time, the physician has not learned the patient's illness information (he already has the private information about the degree of altruism), but he does anticipate learning that in Stage 4. What he does in Stage 3 is to formulate a rule for how the patient is to be treated: if the severity turns out to be such and such in Stage 4, then this or that treatment will be used. Stage 3 is also the contract acceptance stage, and the physician must simultaneously assess whether the capitation payment and cost share can generate a minimum expected pro…t.
The …rst best can be implemented by a contract designed as if the physician were the least altruistic type. Suppose the least altruistic physician puts a 10% weight on consumer's utility. The insurer should o¤er a contract with a 10% cost share and a transfer equal to 10% of the expected …rst-best cost. The 10% altruistic physician will fully internalize the social costs and bene…ts when bearing 10% of the cost. A lump-sum transfer equal to 10% of the expected cost in the …rst best allows the least altruistic physician to break even.
Why can this contract still implement the …rst best when the physician puts, say, a 50% weight on the consumer's utility? If the physician accepts the contract and implements the …rst best, he also breaks even.
The doctor would have liked to o¤er more generous treatments because he was more altruistic. But if he had done so, he would not break even. The transfer is so low-only 10% of the expected …rst-best cost-that more generous treatment plans would put the 50% physician in the red. The nonnegative expected pro…t constraint is so binding that the 50% physician must follow the strategy of the least altruistic physician. It follows that the 50% altruistic physician implements the …rst best.
Next, we study a game in which the physician does not have commitment power. The …rst two stages of the game remain the same. But now in Stage 3, the physician only decides on whether to accept the contract. He does anticipate learning the illness severity in Stage 4, but the treatment decision is postponed until then. The di¤erence, therefore, is that any capitation payment speci…ed in Stage 3 has been paid, and has no bearing on the physician's treatment decision in Stage 4. Now, the single contract in the game with commitment fails to implement the …rst best. The 50% altruistic physician will reject a 10% cost-share contract. In Stage 4, bearing only 10% of costs, the physician now cannot resist o¤ering treatments that are more generous than the …rst best. It is time inconsistent for the 50% altruistic physician to stick to the …rst best. However, the low transfer in the 10% cost-share contract would not allow him to break even. Anticipating the de…cit in the continuation, the 50% altruistic physician rejects the contract in Stage 3.
If the insurer has to retain a physician with high degrees of altruism, contracts with higher cost shares must be o¤ered. In fact, a menu of incentive-compatible payment contracts will be o¤ered, and physicians may earn positive pro…ts. Distortions from …rst-best treatment plans will result, and the insurance premium for the consumer will be higher.
Our results con…rm the e¢ ciency loss due to practice-style variations. However, our analysis also indicates how this loss can be avoided. If treatment plans can be …nalized when the …nancial constraint is relevant, e¢ ciency can be attained. A sort of "bottomline medicine" principle is being advocated whereby resources, including lump-sum payment, and medical treatments should always be considered together. The policy implication is that the insurer should encourage doctors to formulate their treatment plans at the point of contract acceptance, and give doctors incentives to carry out the plan when seeing patients. For example, when o¤ering the single contract, the insurer also suggests the e¢ cient treatment plan as a medical guideline.
In addition, the insurer announces that he will only renew contracts with physicians whose total treatment cost (say in a year) is below a threshold.
In economic models, it has been shown time and again that commitment is powerful. Yet, it appears that here, a physician's commitment power is being exploited by the insurer. A physician earns a zero pro…t when he is able to commit to a treatment plan, but a positive pro…t otherwise. However, physicians in our model are altruistic and their preferences are not based on pro…ts alone. In fact, a physician's total utility may be higher when he has commitment power and is very altruistic.
Although we analyze games in which physicians may or may not commit to treatment plans, commitment itself is taken to be exogenous. In other words, an economic agent in our model cannot choose to be a commitment type or a noncommitment type. This is a common methodology. In fact, we are unaware of any paper in economics that would let an agent choose his own commitment power.
As Arrow (1963) has pointed out, physician altruism seems so natural, and important in the health care market. The economic analysis following such a hypothesis has only been studied quite recently. A contribution here is that altruism interacts with pro…t motives. The implementation of the …rst best depends on physicians caring about their patients, having to make a minimum expected pro…t, as well as being able to commit to treatment protocols.
In the literature, the idea that economic agents have nonmonetary motives has been studied intensively. Murdock (2002) , and Prendergast (2007 Prendergast ( , 2008 . Our paper di¤ers from these works in that the physician's degree of altruism is unknown (see also footnotes 1 and 2 above). Unknown altruism generally brings in a second dimension of asymmetric information. Our paper contributes methodologically to the multi-dimensional asymmetric information problem.
A few papers in the literature use a limited liability constraint, which is identical to our minimum expected income constraint. Makris and Siciliani (2011) consider incentive schemes for altruistic providers who possess private information about production e¢ ciency, but who must be able to break even. Makris (2009) uses a slightly di¤erent setup in which an agent must not be asked to use any of his own wealth. In these two papers, the degree of altruism is common knowledge. Choné and Ma (2011) also use a minimum income constraint. The requirement of minimum pro…t for altruistic agents appears to be both natural and necessary.
Unknown altruism in the health market has been considered before by Jack (2005) and Choné and Ma (2011) . Nevertheless, our paper di¤ers in many ways. In Jack (2005) However, they do not allow the patient to take a treatment sequence. Di¤erent from all these works, our model has multiple treatment options and examines optimal treatment sequences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the …rst best. Section 3 studies the two delegation games. Section 4 discusses related issues and policy implications. Section 5 draws conclusions. Proofs are in the Appendix.
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A risk-averse consumer has income Y and su¤ers from an illness. The loss due to illness is described by a random variable`on a support [0;`], with distribution and density functions F (`) and f (`) > 0, respectively. 4 We assume that the upper support of the illness loss,`, is su¢ ciently large. 5 We let the consumer's utility function be separable in income and the loss from illness, and measure the disutility of illness by the loss, so the consumer's utility is U (Y ) `when`is the illness loss. The function U is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and the marginal utility at zero income is in…nite (U 0 (x) ! 1 as x ! 0 + ).
The consumer's loss due to illness can be recovered by medical treatments. We assume that there are two treatments; in Section 4 we will discuss the case when more treatments are available. A treatment either recovers the loss`or does not, and is de…ned by the probability of success and the cost. Treatment can be taken sequentially, so if a treatment does not succeed, a second treatment can be used. We assume that when a treatment fails once, it will fail again. In other words, the e¤ectiveness of a treatment is perfectly correlated over trials. Given the binary structure, a treatment will never be used twice.
We call the two treatments, Treatment 1 and Treatment 2. Treatment 1 succeeds with probability 1 and costs c 1 . Treatment 2 succeeds with probability 2 and costs c 2 . These four parameters are strictly positive.
Treatment 2 is more e¤ective than Treatment 1 but also costs more, so we have 1 < 2 and c 1 < c 2 . We make an assumption on the relative e¤ectiveness of the treatments:
Assumption 1 says that the cost per unit of success probability of Treatment 2 is higher than Treatment 1.
This is a convexity assumption on treatment costs; the cost per unit of success probability increases with the success probability. We will discuss what will happen if Assumption 1 is violated.
In this paper we consider Treatment Protocols. A treatment protocol describes a sequence of treatments.
There are …ve treatment protocols:
Protocol 0: Do not use any treatment. Without any insurance, the consumer will decide on the treatment protocol after she learns her illness loss. For low values of`, she may not get any treatment; for high values, she may. The consumer faces ‡uctuations in income since she has to bear treatment costs. The consumer can insure herself against income ‡uctuations due to illness by purchasing an insurance contract in a competitive insurance market. Insurers are risk neutral, and they o¤er insurance contracts to maximize the consumer's expected utility subject to a zero expected pro…t constraint. 6 
First best
In the …rst best, illness loss`is veri…able. An insurance contract can be made contingent on the value of`.
Due to risk aversion, the …rst best shields the consumer from all risks due to treatment costs. A …rst-best 6 We can replace the perfectly competitive insurance market by a public regulator.
contract speci…es a premium P and four treatment protocol functions i : [0;`] ! [0; 1], i = 1; 2; 3; 4. The consumer pays P before the realization of`, and will not incur any payment after`is realized and when treatment is used. The function i , i = 1; 2; 3; 4; speci…es the probability that Protocol i is to be used when the consumer's loss is`. We have used the nontreatment Protocol 0 as default.
If the consumer su¤ers a loss`and is treated by Protocol i, her expected payo¤ is U (Y P ) `+ i`.
The …rst-best contract (P; 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ) maximizes the consumer's expected utility
subject to the breakeven constraint
and the boundary conditions
for each`2 [0;`] and i = 1; 2; 3; 4. The utility function in (1) consists of the utility from the income less the premium, the utility loss`, as well as the recovery prospects from the four treatment protocols. The breakeven constraint (2) ensures that any insurance …rm o¤ering the contract will make zero expected pro…t.
The remaining constraints in (3) make sure that the treatment protocol probabilities are consistent.
First, we rank the relative cost e¤ectiveness of the treatment protocols:
According to Lemma 1, in terms of cost per unit of success probability, the ranking, in ascending order, is Protocol 1, Protocol 3, Protocol 4, and Protocol 2. Now, 3 = 4 > 2 , so both in terms of success probability and cost per unit of success probability, Protocols 2 and 4 are dominated by Protocol 3. In other words, Protocols 2 and 4 are less e¢ cient than Protocol 3. 7 7 We brie ‡y comment on the case when the Cost Convexity assumption is violated. In that case, we have c1
The ranking of cost per unit of success probability becomes c2
, so that Protocols 3 and 1 will be ine¢ cient. Proposition 1 will be modi…ed: Protocol 2 will be used for intermediate values of`, while Protocol 4 will be used for high values.
Proposition 1 In the …rst best, the consumer pays a premium P , receives no treatment if her loss is lower than` , Protocol 1 if her loss is between` and` , and Protocol 3 if her loss is higher than` , wherè
` . The premium is given by
Proposition 1 presents two principles in the …rst best. First, the consumer is risk averse, so …nancial risks due to illness will be borne by the insurer. Second, by basic cost-bene…t consideration, the consumer should receive more treatment when her loss is higher. Basic cost-bene…t consideration also eliminates ine¢ cient treatments, so by Lemma 1, Protocols 2 and 4 are never used.
Consider consumer` . His expected utility bene…t from Treatment 1 is 1` , and this is equal to the cost of Treatment 1 measured in utility, U 0 (Y P )c 1 . While the bene…t from Treatment 1 increases in illness loss, the cost remains constant. Therefore, the consumer should receive Treatment 1 if and only if his illness loss is at least` .
As the illness loss continues to increase beyond` , Treatment 2 should also be given if it is needed. At =` , the cost of using Treatment 2 is U 0 (Y P )c 1 which is equal to 2` . Therefore, a consumer with >` should receive Treatment 2 if and only if Treatment 1 has failed. This is Protocol 3.
Altruistic physician and delegation
Suppose now the consumer's illness loss is not observed by the insurer. Although treatments prescribed by the physician are veri…able ex post, they are ex ante noncontractible. The physician will observe the illness loss and be delegated to make the treatment decision. In the delegation regime, an insurance company establishes a payment contract with the physician, and an insurance contract with the consumer. The physician's decision on a treatment plan can be interpreted as his practice style.
The insurance contract for the consumer consists of a premium P . We focus on physician payment and delegation, so we assume that the patient does not bear any …nancial risks ex post. In fact, this is what the …rst best prescribes. The payment contract for the physician is a two-part tari¤, (S; T ), where S is the physician's share of the incurred treatment cost, and T is a lump-sum or capitation payment.
The physician is risk neutral, and partially altruistic to the consumer. The physician learns about the consumer's illness loss`after the payment contract has been accepted. This is a natural assumption in an insurance model because at the time the insurer o¤ers contracts, the consumer is not yet sick. When the physician treats the consumer with Protocol i, his expected payo¤ consists of pro…t and the consumer's utility:
. Both S and T are nonnegative, but we do not restrict S to being less than 1. The pro…t from using Protocol i is T Sc i ; he receives the transfer T , and bears a cost Sc i , with the balance of the cost paid for by the insurer. The parameter measures the strength of the consumer's utility in the physician's preferences.
The altruism parameter is a random variable, drawn on a strictly positive support [ ; ], with distribution and density functions, respectively, G( ) and g( ) > 0. We assume that the hazard rate
is increasing in . The physician knows , and this is his private information. We use the term "typephysician" for a physician with altruism parameter . We assume that F and G are independent.
A higher value of indicates a physician who cares more about the patient's welfare. The strength of the physician's trade-o¤ between pro…t and patient utility is captured by the altruism parameter . In making a decision based on this trade-o¤, the physician must respect an ex ante nonnegative pro…t constraint. In practice, a physician treats many patients, and the likelihood that he makes a loss ex post out of the entire set of patients is negligible. Indeed, if we interpret the consumer as the representative in a mass, then ex ante nonnegative pro…t implies ex post nonnegative pro…t.
As in other agency models, we include a reservation utility constraint. If the altruistic physician does not accept the contract, he does not earn any pro…t, but does not treat the patient either, so his utility is
, which is de…ned to be his reservation utility. 8 To better understand the equilibria when the physician's degree of altruism is unknown, we …rst show, in the next subsection, that the …rst best can be implemented when the physician's degree of altruism is known.
Known altruism
In this subsection, we assume that the altruism parameter is common knowledge. The physician, with known altruism parameter , is paid a lump-sum T ( ), and bears a cost S( )c i when he uses Protocol i for the patient. Subject to the payment scheme, the physician makes treatment decisions for the patient.
Suppose that, on observing the illness loss`, the physician uses treatment Protocol i with probability i (`). His expected utility is
He chooses i to maximize (4) subject to a nonnegative expected pro…t constraint
and a participation constraint:
which says that the utility from accepting the contract is higher than from refusing it. Now, the participation constraint never binds. Rewrite it as
The right-hand side of this inequality is the patient's loss from the lack of insurance. Due to a competitive insurance market, this loss is never positive, so, in fact, minimum pro…t implies participation. 9 In the games with asymmetric information, given the minimum pro…t constraint, the participation constraint remains slack for each type of the altruistic physician, so from now on, we will ignore it. 9 We assume that if the consumer is not served by the physician, the illness remains untreated; this is the utility on the right-hand side of the participation constraint. We can alternatively assume that the consumer is served by another physician, so the right-hand side term is larger. However, we have assumed that the insurer aims to maximize the consumer's expected utility, so the participation constraint remains slack.
where = U 0 (Y P ), and P ,` , and` are the …rst-best premium and threshold loss levels de…ned in Proposition 1.
Lemma 2 Given S( ) and T ( ) de…ned in (6) and (7), the delegation scheme implements the …rst best.
The cost share S( ) in Lemma 2 makes the physician internalize the consumer's treatment cost and bene…t. The partially altruistic physician values the patient's bene…t at i`. To align his preferences with the …rst best, he should be made to bear the cost at c i , where , the marginal utility of income at …rst best, adjusts for the di¤erence in the measurement between bene…ts (in utility) and cost (in money).
This is exactly what S( ) does. Under this cost share, the physician's expected utility in (4) becomes
so the term inside the big square brackets is the consumer's bene…t less cost. The transfer T ( ) ensures that the physician makes a zero expected pro…t.
A more altruistic physician is asked to bear a larger share of the cost ex post because he has a greater incentive to overtreat the patient. The lump-sum transfer T ( ) is proportional to the cost share S( ). Given that all types of physician will incur the …rst-best cost, a more altruistic physician should receive a larger transfer ex ante; otherwise, he will not be able to break even. These …ndings are consistent with Ellis and McGuire (1986) who show that the …rst best can be implemented in a mixed payment system when the physician's degree of altruism is common knowledge. While Ellis and McGuire focus on a single treatment, we show the same results for multiple treatments.
The physician's behavior for the maximization of (4) subject to (5) assumes that he chooses the treatment protocols at the time of contract acceptance and before he observes the illness severity. This assumption is only made for convenience. When S( ) and T ( ) are given by (6) and (7), the physician can also make the treatment decision after he observes`. The treatment decisions will be exactly the same. Hence, the timing for treatment decisions is unimportant when the physician's degree of altruism is common knowledge. This, however, is not true when the physician's degree of altruism is his private information.
Unknown altruism
In this subsection, we study delegation games with unknown altruism. We show that equilibria depend on the physician's timing of treatment decisions. In the case of commitment, the physician follows a predetermined treatment plan before he learns the patient's illness. In the case of noncommitment, the physicians decides on treatment after he learns the patient's illness. We …rst present the game with commitment; the game without commitment follows. In each game, the insurer chooses contracts to maximize the consumer's expected utility, so we assume that the consumer will accept the contract. We assume that the consumer does not know the physician's degree of altruism, but still delegates treatment decisions to the physician.
One might wonder if there would be an incentive for a consumer to seek out a more altruistic physician, and we will discuss this issue in Section 4.
Equilibria in delegation with treatment plan commitment
We show the …rst best can be implemented by a single contract when the physician can commit to a treatment plan made at the point of contract acceptance. The extensive form of the game has four stages.
Stage 1: An insurer o¤ers an insurance contract to the consumer and a payment contract to the physician.
Stage 2: Nature draws from the distribution G. The physician learns .
Stage 3:
The physician decides whether to accept the payment contract, and the consumer decides whether to accept the insurance contract. The game ends if either party refuses to accept; otherwise, the physician also decides on how he will prescribe treatment protocols depending on illness loss.
Stage 4: Nature draws`from the distribution F . The physician learns`, and carries out treatment protocols according to the prescription rule decided in Stage 3. The physician will be paid according to the payment contract.
When altruism is unknown, a type-physician will mimic another type if the full menu of contracts de…ned in the regime of known altruism is o¤ered. From Lemma 2, if a type-physician selects (S( ); T ( )), he will choose the …rst-best treatment protocols and break even. However, the type-physician can do better by exaggerating and choosing a contract meant for type-0 , 0 > . Under (S( 0 ); T ( 0 )), he can still implement the …rst best and break even, but will gain by being slightly less generous than o¤ering …rst-best treatments. This deviation will result in a second-order loss in the consumer's expected utility but a …rst-order gain in the pro…t because T ( 0 ) > T ( ).
Our next result shows that, surprisingly, each type of physician can still be made to implement the …rst best even when the full menu of contracts de…ned in the regime of known altruism fails to do so. This is achieved by a very simple payment contract, namely (S( ); T ( )), de…ned in (6) and (7). This contract is designed as if the physician were the least altruistic type .
A type-physician's best response against (S( ); T ( )) is to select i (`) to maximize
A type-physician's choice of treatment decision in Stage 3 is made contingent on possible illness loss.
Anticipating that he will follow this treatment plan after observing the illness severity in Stage 4, the physician decides whether to accept the payment contract.
Lemma 3 When given contract (S( ); T ( )) de…ned in (6) and (7), a type-physician, with > , chooses the …rst-best treatment thresholds l and l .
Lemma 3 reports a surprising result. Under the payment contract (S( ); T ( )), the best response of the type-physician is the …rst-best treatment protocol. His incentives have been aligned with the …rst best.
Now consider a more altruistic, type-physician. He cares more about the consumer's utility than type-, so he would like to be more generous, o¤ering Protocol 1 at`<` , and Protocol 3 at`<` . Indeed, the …rst-order derivative of (8) The capitation payment T ( ) only compensates for the cost share S( ) when treatments are at the …rst best. The type-su¤ers a loss if he follows a treatment plan more generous than the …rst best. The binding nonnegative pro…t constraint therefore stops the type-physician from being more generous than a typephysician. Since he is able to commit to a treatment plan, it is a best response for the type-physician to accept the contract (S( ); T ( )), and to implement the …rst best. 10 To summarize, we present.
Proposition 2 In the equilibrium under delegation with treatment plan commitment, the insurer o¤ ers a single payment contract (S( ); T ( )). In equilibrium, each physician type accepts the contract and delivers the …rst-best treatment protocols to the consumer.
The key to the …rst-best result stems from the requirement that treatment plans are made when the nonnegative expected pro…t consideration is still relevant. We could consider an alternative extensive form where the physician decides on treatment plans after he has accepted a contract, but before he observes (still fully anticipating that he will). This kind of commitment has no bite, and the equilibrium will be exactly the same as if commitment were impossible (as in the next subsection). This is because once the contract (S( ); T ( )) has been accepted, the treatment plan decision will be determined only by the cost share S( ) while the transfer T ( ) is already received.
Proposition 2 highlights the social value of treatment plan commitment. If the physician determines his treatment plan when accepting the payment contract and sticks to it, the insurer can successfully induce all types of physicians to carry out the e¢ cient treatment plan. Therefore, the unwarranted cost variation due to physicians'heterogeneous preferences can be reduced.
1 0 We have assumed that the altruism parameter is in a strictly positive support [ ; ] . If the support of includes 0 (so that = 0), our result will be modi…ed slightly. Here, the …rst best can be approximated. Setting the payment contract at (S( ); T ( )), where > 0 and is arbitrarily close to 0, will implement the …rst best for all physician types higher than . However, the contract (S(0); T (0)) will not implement the …rst best for any physician type.
The next subsection discusses the scenario when the physician lacks the ability to commit to a predetermined treatment plan.
Equilibria in delegation without treatment plan commitment
The …rst two stages of the game without treatment plan commitment are the same as game with commitment, except that a payment contract is now a menu. The last two stages are as follows:
Stage 3: The physician decides whether to accept the payment menu, and the consumer decides whether to accept the insurance contract. The game ends if either party refuses to accept; otherwise, the physician picks an item from the menu.
Stage 4: Nature draws`from the distribution F . The physician learns`, and decides on treatment protocols. The physician will be paid according to the payment contract that he has selected in Stage 3.
The key di¤erence between games with and without treatment plan commitment is the timing of treatment decisions. Under delegation without treatment plan commitment, the physician makes his treatment decision after he has accepted the contract. In other words, the physician makes the contract acceptance decision and treatment decisions sequentially. By contrast, in the game with treatment plan commitment, he makes the two decisions simultaneously. In both cases, however, the physician fully anticipates receiving the patient's severity information in Stage 4.
Clearly, the single contract (S( ); T ( )) can no longer implement the …rst best. Anticipating using treatment plans more generous than the …rst best, physician types more altruistic than will reject this contract. This is because the transfer T ( ) is so low that they cannot break even.
We derive the menu of optimal contracts by examining the physician's treatment protocol decisions in Stage 4. Suppose that a type-physician has accepted a payment contract (S( 0 ); T ( 0 )) in Stage 3, and learns that the consumer's illness loss is`. His decision is only a¤ected by the cost-share parameter S( 0 ), not the transfer T ( 0 ). Given`and S( 0 ), his payo¤ from choosing Protocol i with probability 
To save on notation, we write b l( ; ) and b b l( ; ) as b l( ) and b b l( ), respectively.
In contrast to delegation with treatment plan commitment, the equilibrium treatment decisions are to be made without any reference to the nonnegative pro…t requirement. In Stage 4, the physician does not have the option of rejecting a payment contract. The requirement of making a nonnegative expected pro…t has no bite here.
Next we study the physician's equilibrium choice of a payment contract in Stage 3. Suppose that the menu f(S( ); T ( ))g has been o¤ered to the physician in Stage 2. We use a generalized version of the revelation principle (Myerson (1982) ). De…ne a type-physician's expected payo¤ from selecting contract (S( 0 ); T ( 0 )) and the thresholds l 0 and l 00 by
We consider equilibria in which a type-physician selects contract (S( ); T ( )), and adopts the thresholds b l( ) and b b l( ). Clearly, for any choice of (S( 0 ); T ( 0 )) the thresholds that maximize V are b l( 0 ; ) and b b l( 0 ; ), as in the continuation equilibrium (10) . A menu of contracts is said to be incentive compatible if
) for all 0 and , and all l 0 and l 00 . Given a menu (S( ); T ( )), de…ne the type-physician's maximum payo¤ by W ( ) max 0 ;l 0 ;l 00 V ( 0 ; l 0 ; l 00 ; ).
Lemma 4 A menu of contracts f(S( ); T ( ))g, 2 [ ; ], is incentive compatible only if W is convex,
and both b l( ) and b b l( ) are decreasing in .
Incentive compatibility requires that the physician's equilibrium utility be convex in the altruism parameter. In other words, the change of the physician's equilibrium payo¤, W ( ), must be increasing. Because U is a utility function of income, its sign can be positive or negative; hence, W and W 0 can be positive or negative. Indeed, signs of W and W 0 are irrelevant for incentive compatibility. Furthermore, Lemma 4 says that the equilibrium thresholds must be decreasing so that a more altruistic physician prescribes more treatments. We write the continuation equilibrium condition (10) as
so incentive compatibility requires the cost share to altruism parameter ratio, S( ) , to be decreasing. This is in contrast with the known case where S( ) is a constant.
To see the intuition, suppose S( ) increases proportionally to . Because the more altruistic physician will prescribe more treatments but has to bear a larger share of the cost, the lump-sum transfer must increase more than proportionally. Otherwise, the physician cannot break even. However, a disproportionately large lump-sum transfer would provide the physician a greater incentive to exaggerate his degree of altruism because he can gain a larger pro…t by withholding treatments. Hence, with constant S( ) , the insurer has to give up too much information rent to induce truth telling. The insurer can do better by reducing the cost share borne by the physician to trade o¤ e¢ ciency for information rent.
Next, we analyze the physician's nonnegative pro…t constraint. By selecting (S( ); T ( )), a typephysician's expected pro…t is
Substituting this expression into
Di¤erentiating both sides of this equation, we have 0 ( ) = W 00 ( ). The convexity of W ( ) implies that ( ) is decreasing. The physician's nonnegative pro…t constraints are therefore simpli…ed to ( ) 0. In other words, if the most altruistic physician breaks even, so do all other physician types. Although the physician's pro…t is decreasing in , his equilibrium payo¤ is increasing due to the altruistic bene…t.
Lemma 5 Incentive compatibility is equivalent to S( )= being decreasing, and hence b l( ) and b b l( ) decreasing. Nonnegative expected pro…t for the physician is equivalent to ( ) 0.
We continue with the derivation of the equilibrium contract menu. Following the standard method in the literature, we replace ( ) by W ( ) to simplify the maximization problem. The insurer must break even given the continuation equilibrium after Stage 1. The total expected expenditure by the insurer equals the expected pro…t and treatment cost, averaged over all physician types. Hence, the premium P satis…es
From W ( ) W ( ) R W 0 (x)dx, we can substitute for W in the expression for in (13):
Then we use (11) in Lemma 4 to replace W 0 (x). After integration by parts, we can substitute for ( ) and rewrite (14) as
The premium for the patient includes treatment costs and the physician's utility, which consists of the base utility W ( ) less the consumer's utility multiplied by the physician's altruism parameter adjusted by the hazard rate (G( )=g( ) + ).
From (13), we have
so ( ) 0 if and only if
The equilibrium in Stage 4 also requires (12) , which says that b l( ) and b b l( ) follow a …xed ratio; this will be shown to be satis…ed, so we will ignore this requirement for now.
The equilibrium allocation implemented by the insurer is the solution to the following program: choose P , W ( ), b l( ), and b b l( ) to maximize the consumer's expected utility
A dG( ) subject to the breakeven constraint (15), the physician nonnegative pro…t constraint (16) , and b l( ), b b l( ) both decreasing. Let denote the multiplier for the insurer's breakeven constraint (15) . We present the characterization of the solution:
Proposition 3 Under treatment plan noncommitment, the equilibrium thresholds and premium,
and P are given by
The type-physician earns zero pro…t, and W ( ) is given by (16) as an equality; all other physician types earn strictly positive pro…ts.
From the equilibrium thresholds in Proposition 3 and equation (12), we can …nd the cost share and transfer functions for the implementation. The cost share function is
and the transfer function is
where W 0 ( ) is determined by equation (11) The determination of the equilibrium thresholds includes the term G( ) g( ) + , the key di¤erence from Proposition 1. The …rst-best thresholds are determined by a straightforward cost-e¤ectiveness principle. This has to be modi…ed due to the missing information about the physician's degree of altruism. The equilibrium cost shares and transfers involve the hazard rate, G( ) g( ) , a standard, Myerson "virtual" adjustment due to private information. Furthermore, treatment bene…ts are valued by physicians, so the adjustment also includes the term in addition to the virtual component.
Because the physician's pro…t is passed on to consumers, we have the following corollary:
The equilibrium premium P is higher than the …rst best premium P .
The comparison between equilibrium thresholds in Proposition 3 and the …rst best is not straightforward.
The …rst best is independent of the distribution of , but the functions b l and b b l have ranges that depend on the distribution as well as the support of . We suspect that for low values of , equilibrium thresholds will be higher than …rst best, while for high values of , they will be lower. That is, less altruistic physicians provide treatments less than the …rst best, and the opposite for more altruistic physicians. 
Equation (19) reduces to = 1=(Y P ). The equilibrium thresholds in Proposition 3 are
By Corollary 1, the premium P is larger than the …rst-best premium P . From (22) and (23), b l( ) and b b l( ) are larger than the …rst-best thresholds for < P P + 2 , and are smaller than or equal to the …rst-best thresholds otherwise. If the di¤erence P P is between and + 2, there exists a type-e physician delivering …rst-best treatments. Physicians less altruistic than type-e will provide less treatment than the …rst best, whereas physicians more altruistic than type-e will provide more.
Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 can explain the wide variations of medical costs. Di¤erences in physician practice styles are here captured by di¤erences in physician altruism. The same illness will be treated di¤erently depending on the attending physician's preferences. Such variations, however, can be avoided if altruistic physicians make treatment decisions when the full …nancial consequences are respected, as Proposition 2 shows.
Discussions and policies

Policy implication
Our analysis suggests that the insurer should o¤er a physician some commitment mechanism together with the single contract (S( ); T ( )) to implement the …rst best. The patient's illness severity is unobservable to the insurer, so medical guidelines on treatment protocols alone are inadequate. Nevertheless, our model suggests a way. When o¤ering (S( ); T ( )), the insurer can propose the …rst best as medical guidelines and announces that the contract is renewed only if the physician can maintain a minimum pro…t at the end of the year. The threat of contract termination acts as a punishment to the physician for overtreatment. This mechanism works when the insurer has a long-term relationship with the physician.
More than two treatments
We have assumed that there are only two treatments available. (iii). Adding Treatment 1 before Treatment 2 raises the total probability of success, and reduces the expected cost due to Cost Convexity, because Treatment 1 has the lowest cost-success probability ratio. Retaining the two-treatment assumption saves on notation, while relaxing it would not lead to qualitatively new results.
Searching for altruistic physicians
In Proposition 3, a physician provides more treatments when he is more altruistic. Therefore, ex post, a consumer prefers to be treated by a more altruistic physician. In Lemma 5, a physician reveals his type by selecting an item from the full cost-share-transfer menu. Typically, however, consumers may not be aware of the …nancial arrangement between the insurer and the physician, so a physician's altruism information may not be inferred.
In repeated interactions, without treatment plan commitment, consumers'incentive to search must exist.
In our setup, after an initial treatment episode, if a consumer knows the illness severity, then she can update her belief about the physician's altruism. For example, suppose that the severity is moderate, but the physician does not recommend Treatment 2 after Treatment 1 has failed. Then the consumer will infer that the physician is not very altruistic.
Searching for more altruistic physicians is irrelevant when treatment plan commitment is possible. In the …rst-best equilibrium in Proposition 2, all physician types provide the same treatment. When search is relevant, it is associated with ine¢ ciency and higher premium due to the lack of commitment in Proposition 3. Search exacerbates ine¢ ciency. To attract consumers, physicians may o¤er more treatments even when their own degree of altruism is low. Clustering of consumers among altruistic physicians may likely increase the premium, too. A policy implication is that ine¢ cient search can be avoided if treatment plan commitment is possible.
Selecting physicians
Physicians earn pro…ts when there is a lack of treatment plan commitment. A way to limit pro…t is to reject some physician types. We have assumed that all types in [ ; ] must earn nonnegative pro…ts. It is possible to relax this by allowing the insurer to retain only those with between and 0 < . This can be implemented by reducing the transfer function T in (21) (say, by a constant). Those physicians with larger than 0 will not accept any contract. All those who accept will make less pro…ts, and the distortion can be reduced.
The cost of rejecting highly altruistic physician types comes in the form of rationing. We have considered contracts for one consumer and one physician. We implicitly have assumed that the aggregate supply equals aggregate demand. Rejecting some physician types reduces the physician supply. Even in a competitive insurance market, the premium may have to increase; otherwise, nonprice rationing results.
Comparison with classical moral hazard
In the classical moral hazard model, the consumer makes all the treatment decisions, and will be made to bear partial treatment costs, but is free to choose the order of treatments. We think that this will perform poorly. First, as we have argued before, this scenario is unrealistic. Consumers currently must rely on physicians for treatments; the complexity of modern medicine rules out independent consumer decisions.
Second, consumer cost sharing may lead to more ine¢ cient decisions. For example, if the consumer is to bear 20% of treatment costs, she may …nd Protocols 2 and 4 attractive, even though these are socially ine¢ cient. In addition, this will impose …nancial risks to patients. An equilibrium in the classical, consumer cost-share model may perform worse than the equilibrium in Proposition 2. Treatment plan commitment performs better than mitigating moral hazard through consumer cost sharing.
Concluding remarks
We study how an insurer can reduce the unnecessary cost due to practice-style variations by designing payment contracts for heterogenous physicians. Our model consists of two new elements. Treatments can be combined, and physicians are altruistic, with di¤erent degrees of altruism. We develop new principles from this setup. First, we show that the …rst-best treatment plan follows a conservative pattern. Second, we consider delegating treatment decisions to physicians, and show that the …rst best can be implemented only when a physician can commit to treatment plans at the time of contract acceptance. We o¤er various policy implications.
Treatment plans involve a time dimension, and it is natural that commitment plays a role in the analysis.
The physician committing to using particular plans may result in time-inconsistent decisions. But such commitment has social value; it reduces premium and ine¢ cient search.
The treatment technology is richer than the usual health care quantity approach. This lets us rule out some treatment combinations as ine¢ cient. However, our main results for delegation under treatment plan commitment and noncommitment should hold without any modi…cation if the physician is choosing a quantity of services.
We acknowledge that our model abstracts from learning. Two issues naturally arise when learning is important. First, the likelihood of treatment success may itself be uncertain. A …rst treatment is often an experimentation for the physician to learn about treatment e¢ cacy. The failure of a treatment may then update the likelihood that other treatments may be successful. Second, illness severity may be uncertain. A …rst treatment may reveal that the illness is more or less severe than initially thought. This new information will impact subsequent treatments.
We have focused on payment contracts based only on the physician's reported type and on full insurance contracts for consumers. In general, the physician's cost shares can depend on the chosen treatments, and consumers may incur copayments. These more general contracts are unnecessary under treatment plan commitment. We already can implement the …rst best with the restricted contracts. More general contracts can potentially improve outcomes when treatment plan commitment is invalid. However, the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency, risk sharing, and incentives is complicated. We have found the characterization under such general contracts intractable. Apparently, separate analyses of demand-side and supply-side incentives are common in the literature, and we have chosen to study supply-side incentives. It is clear, however, that adding demand-side incentives would not permit the implementation of the …rst best because full insurance of …nancial risks cannot be achieved. and c 3 , we substitute c 1 and c 2 by k 1 1 and k 2 2 , respectively, and obtain
which is a weighted average of k 1 and k 2 , so c .
Proof of Proposition 1:
Omit the boundary conditions. Use pointwise optimization, and form the Lagrangian for`:
where > 0 is the multiplier of the premium constraint. The …rst-order derivatives are
The derivatives in (25) are independent of i , so at each`, the Protocol with the highest positive value of @L @ i among i = 1; 2; 3; 4 will be used. If all the derivatives are negative, then no treatment will be used.
First, 2 (`) = 4 (`) = 0 for all`; the consumer never uses Protocols 2 and 4. . From
Lemma 1, when`<` , i (`) = 0, i = 1; 2; 3; 4. Hence, the consumer does not use any treatment wheǹ
Next, from (25), we have
Now de…ne` c 2
2
. (Because we assume that`is su¢ ciently large, we have` <`, and it is wellde…ned.) The expression in (26) is positive if and only if`>` . Both @L @ 3 and @L @ 1 are positive wheǹ >` . Together, we have 1 (`) = 1 when` `<` , and 3 (`) = 1 when` <`<`.
Setting the …rst-order derivative (24) to 0, we have = U 0 (Y P ), so the values of` and` are those in the Proposition. Finally, the premium P is [F (` ) F (` )]c 1 + [1 F (` )]c 3 , which simpli…es to
There is a unique solution for P between 0 and Y . Let g(P ) denote the right-hand side of (27) , wherè and` are now regarded as functions of P . Since U 0 (Y P ) increases in P ,` and` increase in P: The function g(P ) is decreasing in P . The function g(P ) reaches the maximum at P = 0, and
) > 0. The function g(P ) reaches the minimum at P = Y , and g(Y ) = 0 because U 0 (0) = +1. We conclude that there is a unique solution for P = g(P ).
Proof of Lemma 2: First, given the contract (S( ); T ( )), the type-physician chooses treatment protocols i (`), i = 1; 2; 3; 4, to maximize his expected utility
The …rst-order derivative of (28) with respect to i (`) is
upon substitution S( ) by . The …rst-order derivative (29) is the …rst-order derivative (25) for the …rst best multiplied by , a constant. We conclude that the type-physician's optimal treatment decision is …rst best.
Given the contract, the physician's expected pro…t from his optimal, …rst-best treatment decision is
so constraint (5) is satis…ed.
It remains to show that the insurer breaks even. The insurer receives the …rst-best premium P from the consumer. He pays the physician the transfer T ( ), and 1 S( ) share of the cost to the physician. The insurer's expected pro…t is therefore
The insurer breaks even in the …rst-best contract, so P h R`
inside the big curly brackets in (30) is the physician's pro…t and has been shown be to zero. Hence, the insurer makes zero expected pro…t.
Proof of Lemma 3:
The Lagrangian for the constraint optimization program maximizing (8) subject to (9) is
where ' 0 is the multiplier for the nonnegative expected pro…t constraint. From pointwise optimization, the …rst-order derivative with respect to i (`) is:
after substitution by S( ) = . De…ne l (1 + ') and l 00 = c 2
2
(1 + ') . From the proof of Proposition 1, the physician will not prescribe any treatment if l l 0 , will use treatment Protocol 1 if l 0 < l < l 00 and treatment Protocol 3 for l 00 < l.
Next, we show that the Lagrangian multiplier ' must equal 1 for a type-physician. When ' = 1, the loss thresholds l 0 and l 00 are identical to the …rst-best levels, l and l , respectively, so the …rst best is optimal. It remains to show that ' = 1, and we do that by contradiction.
Suppose that ' < 1. Then the loss thresholds satisfy l 0 < l and l 00 < l . The di¤erence between the physician's expected pro…t from choosing thresholds l 0 and l 00 and that from choosing the …rst-best thresholds l and l is
Given that under (S( ); T ( )) the expected pro…t from the …rst-best treatments (the second term, in curly brackets, on the …rst line) is 0, the physician's expected pro…t from choosing thresholds l 0 and l 00 is negative.
This violates the nonnegative expected pro…t constraint, and contradicts the assumption that ' < 1.
Hence, we conclude that ' 1.
Next, suppose that ' > 1. Then the loss thresholds satisfy l 0 > l and l 00 > l . The di¤erence between the physician's expected pro…t from choosing thresholds l 0 and l 00 and that from choosing the …rst-best thresholds is
Again, given that under (S( ); T ( )) the expected pro…t from the …rst-best treatments is 0, the physician earns a strictly positive expected pro…t. Hence, the nonnegative expected pro…t constraint does not bind, and the multiplier ' must be zero. This contradicts the assumption that ' > 1 > 0. Hence we conclude that ' 1. In sum, we have ' = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: First, Lemma 2 has shown that a type-physician will accept (S( ); T ( )) and implement the …rst best. Next, consider a type-physician, with > . According to Lemma 3, he will implement the …rst-best treatment thresholds l and l given contract (S( ); T ( )). Because the contract allows the physician to just break even on the …rst best, the type-physician's payo¤ is
If the type-physician rejects the contract, he receives the reservation utility [U (Y ) E(l)]. Because the insurer maximizes the consumer's expected payo¤,
Given > 0, a type-physician strictly prefers to accept (S( ); T ( )). 
Proof of
It is straightforward to check that S( ) and the T ( ) in (33) satisfy incentive compatibility. Finally, we can choose W ( ) so that ( ) 0. 
We obtain (17) and (18) in the Proposition by setting (34), (36) to zero. From (39), we have = . We then substitute by in and (38), set it to zero, and then apply integration by parts to obtain (19) . By assumption, the hazard rate G( ) g( ) is increasing, so G( ) g( ) + is increasing. Hence, b l( ) and b b l( ) are decreasing in . Finally, from (17) and (18), the ratio of b l( ) to b b l( ) is a constant, so the equilibrium condition in Stage 4, (12) , is satis…ed.
Proof of Corollary 1: Suppose P P . Then
where the equality follows from Proposition 1. From (19), we have
By (17), we have 
where the weak inequality is due to (42), and the strict inequality follows from the term inside the square brackets of (43) being strictly positive. Therefore, b ( ) <` for all . Repeating the same argument, we have b b ( ) <` for all . The consumer receives more treatments and the physician receives pro…ts. This therefore implies that P > P , which is a contradiction.
